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FROM THE COLLECTIONS
“A Letter from Joshua Cushman”
BY MATTHEW MASON
Brigham Young University

I

N LATE 1820, Mainers sent their new state’s first two senators to
Congress. It was a triumphant time for those who had pushed long
and hard for Maine’s separation from Massachusetts and admission
into the Union. They greeted the seating of their delegation to Congress
in November 1820 with great relief, for from early January through early
March of that same year they had seen their state’s admission tied to the
extremely controversial admission of Missouri. Only if Missouri could
be admitted without a restriction on its citizens’ right to hold slaves, the
congressional leadership had declared, could Maine enter.
The linkage of the two states put Mainers in an unusual position.
While the rest of the Union knew this controversy as “the Missouri question,” Mainers tended for good reason to call it “the Maine and Missouri
question.” The demand for statehood worked in favor of Maine’s congressional representatives who opposed the proposed restriction on slavery in Missouri. These men, known as “doughfaces,” had an extra, locally
powerful, argument to add to the usual doughface case that the restriction was unconstitutional and inexpedient: they could also argue that it
was the only thing standing in the way of Maine’s timely admission to
the Union. Such was doughfaceism’s power in Maine that other members of Maine’s congressional delegation who favored the restriction felt
the need to justify their position to their constituents. Maine’s doughfaces also wrote to their constituents explaining their votes on this issue,
but that did not distinguish them from doughfaces in other states – that
restrictionists had to write such a letter was what made Maine unusual.
Still, even in Maine the doughfaces did not feel completely secure
from restrictionist assaults. The controversy had become extraordinarily
sharp and personal, so neither side was immune from attack. Moreover,
the restrictionists’ position tapped into deep wells of antislavery sentiment in Maine just as it did in other northern states. Just days after the
first Missouri Compromise had assured Maine’s admission, Ashur Ware
wrote to fellow Maine politico William King from Portland warning that
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the restrictionists there were “determined to avail themselves of the honest & natural repugnance that is felt for slavery to injure the political
standing of ” Representatives John Holmes and Mark L. Hill, who had
voted in favor of the compromise. The party leadership should defend
them on grounds of their having served the interests of Maine by their
votes, Ware urged. The leadership followed this cue, helping both
Holmes and Hill craft their letters in hopes that they would be able to
put this divisive subject to rest — in their favor, naturally — forever.
They did not get their wish. On November 13, 1820, the same day
that the Senate seated Maine’s Senators John Holmes and John Chandler, it also drew lots to determine when their respective terms of service
would expire. This drawing determined that Chandler’s term would expire on March 4, 1823, and Holmes’ on March 4, 1821. It was not an auspicious omen for healing that the outspoken doughface Holmes, rather
than the less controversial Chandler, would come up for reelection by
Maine’s legislature in January 1821, when feelings were still raw from the
Maine-Missouri crisis.
The state leadership’s worries about Holmes’ prospects soon centered on one particular document, a circular letter written by restrictionist Congressman Joshua Cushman. In early January, King sent
Holmes “one of Parson Cushman’s circulars,” and pointed his attention
to the forthcoming response thereto in the leading Democratic-Republican organ in the state, Portland’s Eastern Argus. Although he assured
Holmes that it would “injure no one but Cushman,” King concluded
only halfway reassuringly that “I think you have not much to fear.” The
Argus’s response included a long train of vicious personal attacks on
Cushman. One typical writer lambasted him as a senile, “vain, inconsiderate weak old man” who was so desperate for power that he allowed
himself to become a tool of the despised Federalists.
Despite King’s dismissive reference to Cushman as a “Parson” who
was out of his league fighting this political battle, Cushman had clearly
struck a nerve with his circular. He certainly had Holmes worried. In response to a jittery letter written January 3, a supporter had to assure
Holmes that he would never desert him, “notwithstanding what Mr.
Cushman may say in his famous printed letters.” When informing
Holmes of his reelection, this same crony dwelt on the comfortable margin of victory in the legislature, despite “friend Cushmans circular letter.” He took pains to underline the fact that Cushman only received one
vote for Senator, “& happy I am to say” that the vote did not come “from
one of his constituents.” An editorial in a sheet with a national profile,
the Richmond Enquirer, likewise exulted in Holmes’ victory as evidence
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that “Joshua Cushman’s plot has exploded. His dark, insidious attempts
to blast Mr. Holmes and to array a Northern party against the South”
had failed. “The citizens of Maine,” the editor gloated, “are not to be
tricked in this way. They love the Union; they love their brethren of the
South; and they will ‘frown indignantly’ upon any man who attempts to
array one part of the Union against the other. Let the other Joshua Cushman’s of the North, take timely warning.”
So what was this letter that had the state’s — and even to some extent the nation’s — political establishment so concerned that their victory over Cushman had to be decisive, even total? The only known copy,
residing at the Maine Historical Society, is a rare document, for despite
its notoriety, it was never published. Cushman clearly hoped to defeat
Holmes and thus limited his audience to state legislators. So he had it
printed, but declared in a postscript to its unnamed recipients that “this
letter is not intended for publicity. It is addressed to you, and other confidential friends.” It was thus its content, and possibly its carefully targeted audience, that caused such consternation in the doughfaces’ ranks.
Cushman began by noting doughfaces’ and southerners’ “moanings”
about New England’s near unanimity in the House of Representatives in
favor of restriction. They had charged repeatedly that such a sectionalist
stance would jeopardize national unity. Why, he asked, should the antirestrictionists affect to be so much more alarmed by “the union of the
one grand division of our country, than the other? In the south you behold eleven states, all contiguous, some proud and aspiring, all united to
a man. In this unanimity there seems to be perceived no danger,” but in
New England’s unity against the extension of slavery, “they seem to spy
out something like treason — some dark design — some nefarious
plot . . . to dismember our grand confederated republic!” Why, he demanded, should northern unity raise such selective outrage? “Is southern wisdom unerring, and southern patriotism immaculate; while those
of the north are dim-sighted, misguided, spurious, and adulterated?
Why this predilection for the south?”
This was an effective restrictionist argument, and Cushman put it
well. One of its advantages was its accuracy; anti-restrictionists both
North and South had proven remarkably selective in their declamations
against northern, but not southern sectionalism. This point also proved
a good political tool, for it allowed restrictionists to paint doughfaces as
not the friends of the Union they claimed to be but rather the naive tools
of haughty, power-hungry slaveholders.
Doughfaces were naive, pursued Cushman, because they did not
know they were being used in this way. They “egregiously err, if they cal-
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culate on obtaining any considerable boon from tameness of spirit, facility of temper, or subserviency to the views of their Southern brethren.”
The District of Maine, for instance, had stayed loyal to the southerndominated Democratic-Republican party in power in Washington despite the fierce opposition to the War of 1812 in the rest of Massachusetts. And “what did Maine gain,” Cushman demanded, “for all her
dutifulness, loyalty, and patriotism, during embargoes, restrictions, and
war?” This sort of loyalty, “which were it in a slave, would have procured
kindness from a benevolent master,” earned Maine treatment no different than if she had “taken an active part in the Hartford Convention.”
Southern congressional leaders’ underhanded linkage of Maine’s admission to the precarious Missouri question demonstrated that. Indeed, the
South had proven that its representatives would act as a unit in exclusive
devotion to “her own interest.”
Powerful as this argument was, Cushman’s message went beyond
castigating the doughfaces as lapdogs of the South who had nothing to
show for their submission. The ultimate moral of this sad story was that
Mainers must realize that “Maine has a common interest” not with the
South but “with her sister states in the vicinity. With them she ought to
have a common bond of union,” and she ought not “to forsake her natural
friends, and to throw herself into the arms of strangers.” The South was
manifestly united and self-centered, and New Englanders needed to
“learn wisdom from their rivals” and defend themselves against the
South’s drive for “undue ascendancy.” “A balance of power” would be
“hereby preserved.” He anticipated that such a call would provoke
doughfaces to brand him a sectionalist who menaced the Union. “Under
the specious pretext of adding strength and perpetuity to the whole,” he
responded, “we should not weaken the parts. Of what is the whole composed but its parts?” In light of this, he concluded, “I question the correctness of that policy which would urge sacrifices on the altar of conciliation. Not on the indiscriminate offerings of peace, but on the balance
of power, depends the safety of our republic” and the perpetuity of the
union of those parts.
In such passages, Cushman offered a thoroughly sectionalist vision
of American life. His emphasis on sections as the building blocks of
Union anticipated John C. Calhoun in its insistence that only solicitude
for all the parts would preserve the whole. His talk of a balance of power
between de facto enemies — indeed, “strangers”! — was just as alarming
for the friends of compromise and Union. “What,” asked one Virginian
when he heard such talk during the Missouri Crisis, “is the political atti-
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tude of nations towards each other, supposed by a balance of power” between the North and the South? “Hostility,” he answered. And “what is
the effect of hostility? War. A balance of power is therefore the most
complete invention imaginable for involving one combination of states,
in a war with another.”
But despite his rather extreme sectionalism and Maine’s doughfaced
political mainstream, Cushman was convinced that popular opinion favored his position. “The moral sense and political sentiments in the
Eastern section of the country,” he averred, “recoil from the very idea of
slavery — at holding any portion of the human race in bondage.” And
thus the restrictionist coalition, which encompassed both Federalists
and Democratic-Republicans, likely presaged a coalition that would
obliterate the old party lines. It was a promising coalition because “even
in Maine, where it was contemplated by our most efficient characters, to
put the advocates for restriction into the back-ground . . . the people
have supported these advocates, and given them unequivocal proofs of
approbation.” Holmes’ and Chandler’s appointment to the Senate “furnishes no fact, viewed in a true light, that leads to a different inference.
There was no direct appeal to the people” in these appointments, and
Holmes’ doughfaced course “did not facilitate, but rendered more difficult his election. But for the Missouri question, there would have been little, or no, opposition” to him. But with the albatross of doughfaceism
around his neck, Holmes “could hardly have succeeded but for the influence of previous arrangements, his own address and management, and
the uncommon exertions of efficient friends. No other man could have
withstood the popular current.”
On one level, this argument was but the latest iteration of politicians’
standard claims to popular support. But in the case of Maine after the
compromise that gained it admission at the price of slavery in Missouri,
the equivocal response of the electorate gave both sides good reason to
declare victory. Moreover, this passage nicely captured the operations of
the doughfaced political machine headed by William King, also known as
the “Junto.” While the Junto was not quite so out of touch with the electorate as Cushman charged here, this portrait did accurately convey the
troubles King’s faction would encounter in the future. Some of those
troubles came in the next presidential election, when the Junto endorsed
southerner William Crawford in opposition to the popular choice, New
England’s favorite son, John Quincy Adams. For all its hyperbole, then,
both Cushman’s letter and the doughfaces’ response illustrate just how
deeply divided Maine was as it strode onto the national stage.

